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This thesis analyzes the factors affecting
distressed property and identifies the principal reasons
for default.
The thesis further analyzes the impact of financial
structure, principal factors of default, and the
probability of an individual property successfully
emerging from foreclosure.
The central question being explored is: From the
vast pool of distressed properties, can opportunities
for long term appreciation be identified by analyzing
the primary reasons for default and the associated
financial structure? The real estate market is
currently absorbing the large inventory of product built
throughout the 1980's. Distressed property will be the
focal point of the real estate industry throughout the
1990's. To a large extent, the business of real estate
development will be real estate redevelopment.
Understanding the variables that drove the national and
regional economies, the local real estate market and the
causes of default will allow investors and financial
institutions alike to identify the properties with the
greatest potential for appreciation.
Thesis Supervisor: Marc Louargand
Title: Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF REAL ESTATE DISTRESS
This thesis examines the nature of distressed real
estate assets. The analysis begins with an overview of
the macroeconomic forces which led to the current
situation of oversupply of new commercial and
residential space in the United States and in New
England. This condotion of excess supply is giving
rise to large scale foreclosures and is threatening the
very integrity of the banking system in the New England
region and elsewhere.
Chapter two contains an overview of the workout
process; the players and relationships which come
together to resolve a troubled or defaulted real estate
loan, much of the material in chapter two is based on
interviews with industry professionals who are engaged
in the work-out process.
Chapter three presents the academic view of the
causes of real estate loan failure, based primarily on a
1985 survey conducted by James Boykin [21 . Boykin's
results were used as a template for a series of
interviews with work-out specialists. The results of
these interviews are resented in chapter four, The
industry view. Finally, chapter five contains a summary
and conclusions of the research.
In order to understand the current state of the real
estate industry it is important to be able to place
todays market into some sort of historical perspective.
That view may give us insight into the variables that
surfaced and converged at the beginning of the last
decade to set the stage for a depressed real estate
market in 1990's. Eight variables have been identified
which stimulated the great building boom and bust of the
1980's. These variables are discussed chronologically
and include: Inflation, Disintermediation, Monetary
Controls, Deregulation, The Economic Recovery Act of
1981, Shifts in Employment Growth, Loss of Bank
Examiners, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
(1) INFLATION.
Historically, periods of high inflation have
occurred immediately after wars. Post war economies
revved up with the increased demand and purchases for
all types of consumer and durable goods, thus, causing
prices to rise in response to this demand.
Prices started to increase during the Vietnam War in
1966, but, unlike other inflationary surges, they failed
to stabilize after a few years. The inflationary surge
continued upward for more than a decade. During the
Vietnam War, the United States concurrently maintained
high defense expenditures and pursued expensive social
programs at home. This "Guns and Butter" approach
during the Vietnam years set the stage for historically
high rates of additional inflation.
The inflationary effect was also due to the
inflation related to the cold war with the Soviet Union.
After WWII, the economy never returned to a peace time
condition of lower military expenditures. For the next
30 years the U.S. maintained a military that was
constantly ready for a full scale war. This continued
emphasis on military spending resulted in constant
inflationary pressure.
Inflation was then raised to greater heights by the
twin oil shocks of the 1970's. The first embargo of
1973-74 more than quadrupled the price of oil. The
second embargo of 1978-79 had the further effect of more
than doubling the price of oil again.
Inflation had become a part of everyday life and
everyone learned how to deal with it. In response to
this inflation, Americans began to change their buying
habits as William Greider describes in Secrets of the
Temple:
"By the late 1970's, most citizens had drawn
their own practical lessons from the experience.
It not only made sense to buy now rather than
later; it also made sense to borrow money in
order to buy things now. Even with higher
interest rates, a loan made today to purchase an
automobile or a television set or a house would
be paid back tomorrow in inflated dollars that
were worth less. So long as wages continued to
spiral upward in tandem with prices, one stayed
ahead by borrowing. If inflation persisted, as
everyone had assumed, debtors would be rewarded
and savers would be penalized. (Greider at p.
17)
The changing consumer attitudes also began to
surface in surveys. Americans were less willing to
avoid debt and thus stop spending as Greider continues:
Jay Schmiedeskamp, research director of the
Gallup Economic Service, saw the new behavior
reflected in surveys of consumer attitudes. "The
brake is off," he said " inflation doesn't slow
people down the way it always has. That's a rather
historic change. There used to be a brake -
inflation came along and people stopped buying.
That isn't happening now."
The prudential wisdom inherited from the past, a
Grandfather's old-fashioned warning to save for the
future and avoid debt, was turned upside down.
Smart young consumers now did the opposite. The
overall effect was neither irrational nor
antisocial. What Grandfather did not understand was
that borrowing and buying drove the American
economy. (Greider at p. 17)
For years the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) had tried
to control inflation, with little success. By the late
1970's things had gotten so out of hand and the FRB felt
that something drastic had to be done to moderate the
economy:
"After years of inflation" Paul Volker told
an audience in the Autumn of 1979, "The long run
has caught up with us." The message was clear to
every member of the Federal Reserve Board, even
to those three reluctant governors who had
recently voted against even a modest increase in
the discount rate. In the last half of
September, their worries about imminent
recession were contradicted by the new data on
economic output coming in from the commerce
department. Despite all the forecasts, the
economy wasn't tipping into a contraction; it
was accelerating again. (Greider at p. 104)
In spite of the efforts to lower inflation by
the FRB, accelerated lending on the part of the banking
system circumvented the positive efforts. Lenders
continued to finance investment for price-driven
opportunities, thus, augmenting an inflationary spiral:
And, despite the Fed's gradual efforts to slow
things down with measured increases in interest
rates, the banking system was actually
accelerating it's lending. Bank credit was
expanding at an annual rate of more than 20
percent, and, as the Fed officials heard from
worried bankers, a lot of new credit was going
into speculative ventures - businesses and
individuals borrowing in order to buy things on
the rising prices, speculative investments from
gold and silver to real estate. They were
betting that inflation would drive prices much
higher. The smart speculator would then sell
the commodities or other tangibles, repay the
loans and reap a smart quick profit. (Greider
at p. 104)
Despite the concerns that lending institutions had
over where the money they were lending was going,
customers had to be kept happy. As tales of customers
making profits on their real estate came in, money for
new projects continued to go out. A cycle of constant
increases in prices due to the demand for real estate as
a inflation hedging investment vehicle resulted. While
bankers have always said they were in the business of
lending money, it never really occurred to them that
they may be feeding the population's desire to
speculate:
Speculation did not look like a risky bet:
the overall inflation rate was near 13 percent
and the price of oil was increasing at an
alarming rate of more than 6 percent a month- an
annual inflation rate of nearly 80 percent.
Gold had jumped 28 percent in value in a single
month, reaching a new record of $411 an ounce.
The price of silver, in the same period, had
increased by a staggering 53 percent, up to$16.89 an ounce. (Greider at p. 104)
The constant atmosphere of inflation created
fear on the part of regulators that a collapse was
imminent:
"The specter of 1929 was raised by me and
others," Governor Coldwell said. "Look, we're
on the verge of going into hyperinflation in the
United States." While that sounded much too
apocalyptic, the frenzy of borrowing and buying
did resemble the potential for a classic
speculative bubble, one of those fevers that had
occurred periodically in economic history. The
marketplace loses touch with real value and
plunges forward in an orgy of acquisition.
Whether it is stocks or bonds, corner lots in
big cities or undeveloped swampland in Florida,
speculative bubbles all derive from one
conviction: the buyers are convinced that in a
few days or weeks or months they will become
sellers and unload their purchase at a profit.
Bubbles always collapsed eventually; the fever
broke and prices fell drastically. Then
speculators were forced to sell at a loss. They
failed and so would banks that lent them money
to take their gambles. That is approximately
what happened to wall street in 1929, when the
bubble of financial speculation burst and the
stock market collapsed. (Greider at p. 105)
Guarantees on all deposits by the Federal Government
meant that government agencies, not the investors, bore
most of the risk. In the course of their lending, banks
would promote the virtues of a 20% equity, fully
collateralized loan. Yet, the banks themselves would
only have 3% of their assets set aside in reserves to
act as a safety valve. Even if they had ten times that
amount in reserves, they would not be able to survive a
large, sudden drop in the value of their assets.
The combined result of many variables was a period
of inflation unprecedented in the history of the United
States. From 1967 to 1979, prices increased by over 100
percent:
Inflation in the late 70's caused prices to
rise the fastest they had in 20 years, inflation
in 1979 averaged more than 13%. The
inflationary surge was reflected in the consumer
price index which was calculated as 100 with
1967 prices. By 1970 it was 1.16. By 1975 it
was 161. Four years later in 1979 it was 217.
(Greider at p. 101)
Thus, a decade of real estate investment was driven
by highly leveraged deals which required price inflation
in order to make them successful.
(2) DISINTERMEDIATION.
Disintermediation is a flow of funds out of the
banking or financial intermediary system. Financial
Intermediation is the flow of funds into the system.
Banks act as the conduit between savers and the
borrowers. Disintermediation occurs when the money
flows away from these intermediaries to alternate
investments.
The FRB saw the control of credit as the most
important function of the Central Bank.
Disintermediation, familiarly known as credit crunches,
was a result of the FRB attempting to control the
expansion of credit. As the FRB tightened the money
supply and pushed up interest rates, thousands of people
withdrew their funds in favor of new options like the
money market account offered by Wall Street firms, which
offered returns superior to bank and thrift deposits.
Disintermediation was prevalent throughout in the
1970's. Unregulated firms on Wall Street were able to
offer small investors money market accounts with check
writing privileges which paid a higher yield than the
banks could offer. These accounts were the first
unregulated depository accounts which could pay yields
higher than those allowed by Regulation "Q" which
limited the amount of interest that could be paid by
banks and thrift institutions.
Money rushed out of financial intermediaries such as
the savings and loan associations. As a result these
thrifts were unable to make new mortgage loans. When
mortgage lending stopped, the housing industry was
essentially shut down. Even though the home buyers and
contractors were willing to pay higher interest rates
for the access to the capital. The shut down came from
the investors who refused to provide money since returns
were artificially depressed resulting from government
ceilings on the amount of interest which could be paid.
Investors who had held their funds in regulated savings
accounts drawing 5 percent interest withdrew their money
and placed it in unregulated investments providing much
higher returns.
Financial institutions were suffering from both
external and internal threats at the same time.
Externally, Wall Street firms had found an ingenious way
around Regulation "Q" with their money market funds,
these new accounts enticed away the money that S&L's had
considered sources of long-term stable funds. Thrifts
immediately found themselves unable to depend upon their
liability base. In search of new funds to lend, the
thrifts were forced to pay a higher price for new money
which came from borrowing, not from traditional
deposits. The resulting condition thrifts found
themselves in was known as "negative yield". This
occurred whenever the current cost of funds rose above
the mortgage portfolio yield. The Boston Globe
describes the situation of the banks in a July 30, 1990
article:
By the late 1970's, virtually all of the
money the thrifts made came from long-term,
fixed-rate mortgage loans that earned about 6
percent interest. Virtually all the money they
lent came from deposits on which they paid about
5 percent interest. As long as there was a
spread between the two rates, they were assured
of profits. The moment there was not, they were
in (negative yield) trouble. The trouble
started in the early 1980's when overall
interest rates rocketed. The spread on which
the institutions depended disappeared, and the
industry effectively went broke. (Boston Globe
at p. 16)
Each time a credit crunch developed, the FRB was
denounced by home builders, the S&L's, and other
effected parties. The actions by the FRB choked off the
access to credit. The result of these tight money
episodes was creation of a pent-up demand for housing.
This demand was heightened by the maturation of the baby
boom generation into the housing market.
So much money left the banking industry that both
bank's and thrift's survival was threatened. Starting
in 1978, with an attempt to save the banking industry
from the competition of Wall Street firms, Congress
started formulating ways to allow banks to compete. The
result was the Monetary Act of 1980, a law which
deregulated the banking industry. The major part of the
deregulation influenced the thrift industry.
Thus, the real estate lending industry changed
overnight. Thrifts were given the additional power to
go after high yield (and high risk) commercial real
estate loans, land and construction loans. In
addition, they had new powers to operate real estate
development subsidiaries. Banks had new competition for
the real estate borrowers at the high risk end of the
spectrum.[16]
(3) MONETARY CONTROLS.
The FRB had also failed to achieve a desired rate of
economic growth which they had previously done by
controlling interest rates.
The Federal Reserve System operated like the
modern equivalent of the king's keep - a
separate storehouse alongside the private
economy and independent of its forces. But the
Fed could influence the financial flows inside
the plumbing through two tiny valves - mere
pinpricks in size compared to all the wealth in
circulation. One valve was the discount window
at each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks,
where commercial banks routinely borrowed
hundreds of millions, even billions, every day
to make up for temporary shortages in their
required reserves. The other, more important
valve was the Open Market Desk at the New York
Federal Reserve Bank in the middle of Wall
Street, where the Fed bought and sold government
securities in the open market, in daily
transactions usually running from $500 million
up to several billion. In both cases the Fed
created money with a keystroke of the computer
terminal (computer accounting having replaced
"the stroke of a pen"). (Greider at P. 32)
In times of crisis, the Federal Reserve used the
Discount window as a means to inject liquidity into the
system. A change in operating method was installed and
a monetarist approach was adopted. This change was in
response to those people who were feeding the
"inflationary psychology". The borrow and buy behavior
seemed to permeate everything. The Board's answer was
to tighten the money supply.
Historically, the FRB had controlled the economy and
access to credit by manipulating interest rates. In
1979, the general feeling was that inflation was out of
control. Paul Volker, the Chairman of the FRB at the
time departed from traditional wisdom and adopted the
monetarist method of controlling the money supply. This
approach controlled the total amount of money in the
economy at any one time. The result would be
controlling spending by not making money available,
thus, the interest rate would be allowed to fluctuate
according to market.
This change in operating method was put into effect
Saturday, October 6, 1979. By making this historic
change in the availability of money the FRB was
attempting to shock the economy, Wall Street, and the
World into the notion that they were serious about
controlling inflation. The monetary supply changes made
would come to be known as the "Saturday Night Special".
(Greider at p. 140)
When money became scarce, resourceful
bankers had ways to obtain more of it, despite
the rising price, and to amply finance their new
loans. Typically, they would sell off
government securities to raise funds for lending
and raise the market rate offered on their own
certificates of deposit- in effect, luring away
the deposit money that was fleeing from credit
unions and S&L's.
The bankers also borrowed more from the
Federal Reserve itself, simply by phoning the
discount window officer at one of the twelve
Federal Reserve Banks. Discount borrowing
soared shortly after the October 6 announcement
to more than $3 billion a day, subsided for
several months and then reached another peak
later of $3.5 billion a day. The Fed's decision
to raise the discount rate to 12 percent hardly
discouraged bankers from "going to the window,"
as they called it. When the alternative was
borrowing in the money market where short term
rates were bouncing as high as 18 percent, The
Fed's discount rate was still a bargain.
In theory and myth, The Federal Reserve's
Discount lending was the power of life or death
over private banks. If a bank relied too much
on the Discount privilege, the Fed could simply
refuse its request for a loan - threatening the
bank with crisis and possibly insolvency. In
practice, the central bank rarely, if ever, said
no at the discount window. A bank might be
scolded, perhaps subjected to a rigorous
examination or told to "stay away from the
window" until its affairs were in order. But
the Federal Reserve would not refuse to make a
discount loan unless it had concluded that the
bank was already doomed. The Fed's original
purpose was to prevent bank failures, not cause
them, a reality that aggressive bankers
regularly exploited. (Greider at p. 141, 142)
During the late 1970's banks were under siege. The
banks were reeling from competition from Wall Street and
the negative yields which were being experienced. Banks
then started looking for a safe haven where they could
stabilize their balance sheets. But, with the change
made by the FRB in their method of controlling the
economy, the bank's customers were filled with
uncertainty regarding their ability to meet their
capital requirements. The customers demanded future
access to capital and the banks responded with credit
lines.
Unfortunately, while the FRB was attempting to
tighten the money supply through monetary policy an
explosion in the availability of credit took place.
Individual bankers made credit lines available to
borrowers who felt threatened by a credit cut-off due to
the new monetary controls. These credit lines could
always be financed through the FRB's Discount Credit
Window. The final result was a level of credit
available which was actually higher than existed prior
to the imposition of monetary controls.
In the months following October 6, while attempting
to fine tune the new operating method and tighten the
money supply, the FRB inadvertently flooded the
financial markets with available cash. The result was
the opposite of what the FRB had intended. The banks
had the makings of a potential crisis; they had
committed to reserving capital for their customers with
credit lines and simultaneously placed the FRB's
"mistaken cash" into the hands of their credit hungry
customers.
(4) DEREGULATION.
Deregulation was a direct response to
disintermediation. It was generally felt that without
some adjustment, banks would be hard pressed to survive
in a competitive interest rate environment.
Deregulation was an attempt to allow banks and thrifts
to compete on an equal footing with Wall Street firms
for the savings of American families. Although
deregulation started with good intentions, the end
result forced the S&L's to compete in an arena they were
not prepared or qualified to work within. An
understanding of the effect of deregulation requires a
look at banking before and after Regulation "Q".
Regulation "Q" initially established the rules and
regulations governing the thrifts. Under Regulation
"Q", banks and thrifts had different purposes in the
banking industry: Thrifts were given an interest rate
advantage over banks (they were allowed to pay a higher
interest rate on pass book savings accounts in order to
attract capital) to encourage mortgage lending and
broader home ownership. Thrift services included home
mortgages, personal loans, and savings accounts with
regulated interest rates. The intent and the purpose of
thrifts was to be long term lenders.
Regulation "Q" was also a way of settling potential
conflicts between banks and thrifts regarding the
services each was to provide. It also compensated banks
for the interest rate advantage the thrifts were
enjoying. Under regulation "Q" thrifts would not be
allowed to use their interest rate advantage by
operating in the banks core businesses, such as
commercial and construction lending.
Regulation "Q" advanced the idea of matching the
term structure of assets and liabilities which was
referred to as "balancing the books" by bankers. The
thrifts attracted stable, long term savings with their
higher interest rate, from which they could lend long
term home mortgages. Long term loans, from long term
deposits. The bank's asset base was unpredictable and
would flee to higher interest opportunities, as a result
they offered short term loans. Short term loans, from
short term deposits.
Banks offered the same services as thrifts, plus
they also offered: commercial lending, brokered
certificates of deposit (CD's), acquisition,
development, and construction loans (AD+C), and were
allowed to operate service organizations or 151 B
corporations which is a real estate development
subsidiary of the bank . Banks provided these additional
services due to the belief by regulators that banks had
the expertise to control the additional risk associated
with the broader services.
Under the Monetary Act of 1980, Regulation "Q" was
discontinued which resulted in the thrifts being
stripped of their interest rate advantage over
commercial banks. In addition, thrifts now had to keep
a percentage of their assets on reserve with the FRB.
The imposition of universal reserve requirements put all
banks and thrifts in the same position regarding
reserves. Under Regulation "Q" thrifts were limited in
offering savings accounts, personal loans, and
mortgages. With deregulation thrifts were able to offer
all their traditional services of a full service bank,
and now were able to offer all forms of commercial
lending, brokered CD's and AD+C loans.
Under deregulation the role of the neighborhood S&L
went from making personal loans to sophisticated lending
such as factoring receivables for large corporations as
part of their credit lines and lending on risky
commercial real estate projects. Thrifts were also
allowed to offer checking accounts or NOW (negotiated
order of withdrawal) accounts, which had the benefit of
earning interest on their balances, a feature not
offered by commercial banks.
Approaching the early 1980's, troubled thrifts were
finding it nearly impossible to make enough money to
cover the negative yield spread on their large mortgage
portfolios. Despite recent congressional focus on
savings and loan fraud, recent evidence supports that
negative yield, incompetence and inexperience with the
new business lines were the primary causes of the S&L
debacle. The July 30, 1990 Boston Globe article dealing
with the congressional attempts to prosecute the "S&L's
Kingpins", restates what most industry observers now
agree:
Virtually the entire industry was bankrupt by
the early 1980's, long before most of those now
accused of wrong doing had even entered the
business. The reason was not crime, but
spiralling interest rates that drove up
institutions borrowing costs and drove down the
value of their principal assets: long-term, low
interest mortgages. (Boston Globe at p. 16)
The deregulation of financial institutions led to
S&L's competing with commercial banks and Wall Street
firms. The search for higher yields resulted in the
funding of projects involving higher risk and more
speculation. This situation was further compounded by
the conversion of mutual thrifts to stock thrifts whose
shareholders demanded better performance.
Mutual thrifts are thrifts that are owned by the
depositors. Depositors could not take the benefit of
ownership in the form of higher interest rates on their
savings, because Regulation "Q" limited the amount of
interest a thrift could pay to it's depositors. This
resulted in the thrifts having excess capital on hand,
with no means of passing it on to the owners. The
Boston Globe describes the results:
"...this led to public anger, over huge
salaries, exorbitant perks and cozy deals at
individual thrifts" (Boston Globe at p. 16)
Stock thrifts on the other hand are similar to the
structure of many companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. Stock thrifts are owned by share holders with
concern focused on the price of the stock, earnings, and
quarterly results. The management of these stock
thrifts generally operated within a lean environment.
Given the approach of stock thrifts of being hard nosed
and disciplined with respect to their earnings, the
mutual thrifts preferred to remain under their present
structure.
The management of the S&L's was simply not qualified
to offer the additional services they were now allowed
to. After regulation "Q" the S&L's were also not
qualified to manage the riskier projects they were
becoming involved in. The opinion at the time in
Congress was that the S&L's were failing due to
disintermediation. Under deregulation competition now
took place on an equal footing, Congress had adopted the
approach of survival of the fittest.
Vincent F. Martin Jr. CEO of TCW Realty Advisors, a
Los Angeles based real estate investment firm feels
deregulation of the banking industry had a significant
impact on the real estate market. Mr. Martin described
the scenario developers faced in obtaining financing for
their projects: previously, the developer had to obtain
permanent financing, in order to secure the construction
financing to start the project. This situation assured
the construction lender (the short term lender), that
financing would exist for them to be "taken out" when
the developer fulfilled the contractual responsibilities
of the construction. [11]
Prior to 1980, fifteen major insurance companies
provided permanent or "take-out" financing. These
fifteen companies acted as a control to the real estate
market not only by controlling the supply of money for
projects, but, by also employing seasoned real estate
professionals who would filter out projects that were
not economically sound. Through 1979, these real estate
professionals operated as a check on the unbridled
enthusiasm and optimism of developers. These
underwriters provided a very important restraint on the
market by regulating the supply of money, in turn
limiting the amount of finished product which would
eventually enter the market.
Mr. Martin contends that the impact of deregulation
removed the controls these real estate professionals had
on the real estate market. Before deregulation, there
were 15 accepted sources of permanent financing, now
there were thousands. Deregulation resulted in banks
and thrifts starting to provide "mini-perms" which had a
6 year term and would act as both the construction and
the permanent financing for a project.
(5) THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, (ERTA).
The changes made in the Federal Tax Code from the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) both encouraged and hindered
investment in real estate. These Acts mirrored the boom
and bust of the 1980's. Prior to ERTA, the marginal tax
rate was 70% and real estate received a 50% capital
gains exclusion. These rates resulted in a effective
maximum capital gains tax on real estate of 35%. The
passage of ERTA in 1981 included tremendous incentives
to invest in real estate. Under ERTA, the marginal
federal tax rate was lowered to 50% and the capital
gains exclusion was raised to 60%. When combined, these
rates lowered the effective maximum capital gains tax
rate to 20%.
Expansion of the investment tax credits was another
feature of ERTA. They offered incentives for specific
types of real estate. Credits were given for historic
rehabilitation and subsidized housing. Vaguely written
Treasury Regulations allowed tax credits to be issued
for a wider range of real estate projects than
originally intended. The effect was the creation of a
real estate market to take advantage of the tax saving
components of real estate. In addition, ERTA introduced
very rapid depreciation rules. Which increased the
accounting loss in tax-sheltered deals. Passive
partners who could write off losses from those real
estate shelters against ordinary income with few limits.
ERTA changed the depreciation period from the expected
useful life of the property to an arbitrarily determined
period of 15 years. The accelerated cost recovery
system's (ACRS) method of depreciation used the rapid
175% declining balance method. This resulted in ACRS
producing an astounding first year deduction of 12% of
depreciable cost.
(6) SHIFTS IN EMPLOYMENT GROWTH.
Changes in employment growth came from three
different but related sources. First, the maturation of
the baby boom generation led to swelling of the job
market to accept the largest addition to the work force
in the history of the United States. As jobs were
created, the corresponding demand for housing challenged
the building industry to keep up.
In New England, we also saw the growth of the
high-tech and financial services industry and the
evolution of the working population from a traditionally
blue collar population into white collar professionals
and technical workers.
This change was common in the northeast as shifts in
employment growth took place. White collar
professionals were typically made up of the technical
and administrative population. The new white collar
professionals did not absorb the existing housing stock,
instead choosing to purchase new and upscale housing.
The Northeast region in general and Massachusetts in
particular has been losing population and it's
manufacturing base for a number of years. Manufacturing
has moved mostly to southern states due to the warmer
climate, lower wages, and a lower cost of living.
During the years that Massachusetts was experiencing
a boom in construction from 1980-1989, the state also
experienced a slow growth in population which was offset
by out-migration. The overall result was more people
moved out of the state than moved into the state.
Despite these shifts, many people wishing to enter the
state were unable to find housing comparable to what
they were accustomed to.
This churning of the population in Massachusetts was
driven by the growth of industries loacted on the urban
fringe, the semi-circle defined by routes 128 and 495
in the Boston area. The new arrivals sought suburban
housing in this corridor, so they were not particularly
attracted to the older blue collar inner suburbs lying
between Boston and route 128. As a result, a minor
change in total population led to a major boom in
housing in the outer suburbs of metropolitan Boston.
Between 1984 and 1986, the median price for an
existing home went from $82,600 to $177,000. The end
result was, a single family home in Boston was priced
nearly twice the national median.
(7)LOSS OF BANK EXAMINERS IN MID 1980's.
Many examiners left government service with the lure
of private sector salaries. The loss of bank examiners
during the 1980's had a dramatic impact upon the ability
of the banking system to enforce the governing rules and
regulations. The exodus was so large that it took the
government agency over a decade to replenish the staffs.
Dennis Aronowitz, a professor of banking law at Boston
University describes the situation faced by bank
regulators:
Bank examiners are a cadre of professional
employees, whose training is extensive and
costly to the agencies. In recent years, many
examiners have left government for higher
salaries within the banking industry. In fact
during the mid 1980's the Comptroller and the
FDIC suffered reductions of as much as one third
of their examination forces and only recently
rebuilt to the staff levels of ten years ago.
(Arnowitz at p. 6)
The loss of bank examiners could not have happened a
worse time. The early 1980's represented a time when
banking had lost equilibrium and seemed out of control.
There was a likelihood that the banks would utilize
their safety net of federal deposit insurance, and there
was a shortage of examiners to alert regulators to
potential problems. According to data supplied by the
agencies, the total number of bank examiners currently
employed by the three banking regulators is between 5543
and 5788. The breakdown is: 2600 at the OCC; between
1983 and 2229 at the FDIC; and 960 in the federal
reserve system.
(8) TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986.
The intent of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) was
to close loopholes which created tax shelters. TRA
classified real estate into two different categories:
residential and nonresidential. The two new categories
were given new cost recovery periods with 27.5 years for
residential and 31.5 years for nonresidential. The
depreciation method for both classes became the straight
line method. The effect was to take almost all of the
tax sheltered benefits away from real estate.
A contrast of the changes related to tax benefits
associated with cost recovery periods from ERTA to TRA
is illustrated by the fact that under ERTA's accelerated
cost recovery system 100% of the investors money was
returned after 15 years. Under TRA, after 15 years less
than half of the depreciable cost would be returned with
the balance being recaptured over the remaining 16.5
years.
TRA also eliminated all capital gains exclusions,
and a single tax rate of 28% was created for all
income over $15,000. As in the past, capital gains
losses were allowed to be written off against capital
gains. However, if the losses exceeded gains, the
amount deductible against personal income was limited to
$3,000. The resulting effect was that these changes
significantly reduced the appeal of real estate to the
average investor.
Another aspect of TRA was passive loss
limitations. The intention of TRA was to allow passive
losses to offset passive gains. In certain cases,
passive losses can be used to offset other income, if
the material and active participation criteria is met.
Taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes (AGI) of less than
$100,000 can deduct $25,000 in passive losses against
non-passive income. If AGI is more than $100,000, fifty
cents on the dollar in passive loss benefits is lost for
every dollar which income exceeds $100,000. Thus if AGI
is $150,000 all passive loss benefits are lost.
THE EFFECT OF THE EIGHT VARIABLES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE NATIONAL OFFICE MARKET.
In order to understand the implications from the
eight variables just described, it is useful to examine
the growth of national office market through the 1980's.
An economic study by Professor William Wheaton of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor
Raymond Torto of the University of Massachusetts
documents this tremendous growth.
The impact of the variables as they surfaced and
converged during the 1980's was significant. As a means
of illustration, a review of the growth of the national
office market from World War II proves useful. Wheaton
and Torto explain the basic changes taking place in the
character of the national office market:
During the post World War II period, the
American office market has exhibited two
distinct trends: long run growth and a shorter,
8-10 year cycle. The long run growth of the
market has come largely in response to the
sustained growth of those types of employment
that require office space. In general, there
have been two sources of such employment growth.
First, even though manufacturing employment
has continued to decline as a share of the total
economy, the proportion of the manufacturing
work force classified as "white collar" has
risen from 20% at the end of the war to close to
40% today. During this same period, the
percentage of manufacturing employees involved
in "central administrative functions" has also
more than doubled. Thus, even if manufacturing
is declining, changes in product, planning, and
technique have generated a growing demand for
offices.
The second, and much more important, source
of office demand has been the enormous growth in
non-manufacturing employment -- particularly
finance, insurance, business and professional
services. Employment in these sectors occupies
office space almost by definition, and since the
mid 1950's it has grown from 3 to almost 12
million workers. (Wheaton and Torto at p. 3)
Historically, dramatic fluctuations in the growth
rates of the national office market supply have taken
place. Even during periods of time where economic
growth was constant, different rates of long-term
employment growth were experienced. In addition, the
net absorption rate of the office space fluctuated due
to changes in employment patterns. Torto and Wheaton
continue:
While these long run changes from an
industrial to a service economy, and from
"blue-collar" to "white-collar" employment are
not likely to abate, the pace of growth has
fluctuated considerably. During recessions,
such as those of 1960, 1971, 1975, as well as
1982, the growth in office employment slackens
to the point of little or no increase. Equally
important, during the periods between
recessions, there were also significant
differences in the rates of longer-run growth.
Office employment grew most rapidly during the
last half of the 1960's and 70's, and more
slowly during the early 60's and early 70's.
Growth during the recent recovery has matched
and in some cases exceeded that of the late
1970's.
In response to this pattern of employment
growth the net absorption of office space also
fluctuated. Net absorption rose gradually
throughout the 1960's from annual levels of
fifty million square feet in the first half of
the decade to 100 million square feet in 1969.
Absorption fell sharply in 1970-71, rebounded a
little in 1973-74 and fell again in 1975-76.
From there it rose again sharply, at several
points reaching 140 million per year during the
late 1970's, and in 1981. Once again, a
recession sent it plunging in 1982-83, from
which it has rebounded in 1984-85. (Wheaton and
Torto at p. 4)
In spite of these fluctuations, the perception of
an increased demand for office space existed.
Nevertheless, the result of these dramatic fluctuations
was that the demand for office market space became very
difficult to predict. Thus, a possibility existed that
developers would overbuild due to what they perceive to
be greater demand. Wheaton and Torto describe the
various periods of growth which have taken place:
On the supply side, the stock of office
space has grown from roughly 1 billion square
feet in 1955 to 3.8 billion square feet today.
The pace of new office construction has
fluctuated greatly, however, and since the
mid-50's there has been three distinct building
booms. The first was during the late 1950's,
lasting roughly three years and producing a
total of 228 million square feet over that
period. From there, construction slowed during
the 1960's, grew at a stable rate during the mid
60's and then entered the second boom period,
1968-74. This second boom was more pronounced,
and lasted almost seven years, producing a
35
record 810 million square feet of new space. It
ended with a recession, and record 15% vacancy
rates.
For two years after the second boom, the
market was quite depressed, with building
activities at levels typical of the 1950's.
This slackening set the stage for the third and
current boom, Which so far has also lasted seven
years, and produced 1300 million square feet of
new space -- almost as much as was produced in
the entire preceding 20 years. (Wheaton and
Torto at p. 5)
The following chart documents the cycles of growth
the national office market has experienced:
Office Construction Cycles
Period Phase Ann.Const. Tot.Const.
1957-59 Boom 76.0 228.0
1960-65 Trough 59.0 179.0
1965-70 Stable 74.0 369.0
1970-75 Boom 108.0 810.0
1975-80 Trough 69.0 144.0
1980-84 Boom 172.0 1293.0
(Wheaton and Torto at p. 5)
In explaining the cycles of growth, Wheaton and
Torto conclude that the office market reacts to and is
driven by the changes in employment population. The
results assure that an eight to ten year spread exists
between vacancy peaks as the study continues:
The three peaks in office construction have
been matched by three peaks in the national rate
of office vacancy. From a low of below 5% in
the 1950's, the national vacancy rate rose to a
peak in the mid-1960's of 8.5%, fell to 4% in
the late 60's, rose to 14% in the mid-70's, fell
to 5% by 1979 and is currently up to an all-time
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high of 16%. Again, 8-10 years seem to
characterize the spread between these vacancy
peaks - which tend to follow the peaks in
construction by several years. (Wheaton and
Torto at p. 5)
The complicated nature of the national office
market makes it impossible to assume that all growth is
related to the supply side of the equation. Surges in
demand have also had a dramatic impact upon the growth
in the supply of office space. Much of demand is
related to time lags from the preliminary phases of the
project to the actual completion as Wheaton and Torto
explain:
It would be tempting to conclude from this
brief historical analysis that the office market
has an inherent and predictable cycle of 8-10
years duration, upon which the industry could
rely for it's plans. Unfortunately, the market
is more complicated than this, because there are
alternatives explanations for the cycle, each
with a different implication for the future.
The first explanation, which might be
called a "supply-side" theory, argues that the
industry itself creates the cycle, largely
through it's inability to forecast correctly.
Without reliable forecasts, developers start new
projects only when current market conditions are
favorable. Extrapolating these favorable
conditions into the future, the industry as a
whole continues building. When the space
actually becomes available several years down
the road, the market naturally softens as the
supply is slowly absorbed. The downturn causes
the industry to postpone construction plans for
a while, which only creates a tight market, and
starts the whole cycle over again. According to
this "supply-side" theory, then, the cycle is
caused by the use of current market conditions
as a barometer for the future, rather than by an
accurate forecast of demand that also
anticipates the likely construction response of
the whole industry.
While the supply-induced theory has some
supporters, and also some undoubted truth, it
ignores the unanticipated variations in demand
that have occurred over the last few decades.
Consider, for instance, the fact that the sudden
surge in office demand during 1966-1970 was
totally unanticipated, and found little supply
to match it. Even though construction soon
raced to keep up with demand, the enormous
supply of space authorized during the 1969-73
period did not become available until 1972-76, a
period when demand was slowing, ending a
recession. In each of these cases, even the
best planning by developers would likely have
been spoiled by the macro-movements of the
national economy. Perhaps more interesting is
the prospect that the building activity of the
last 18 months will be coming on line in
1986-87, as the economy slows. Thus variations
in demand, or long-run office employment growth,
and a series of unanticipated recessions, have
also clearly been important in explaining the
past cycles of the office market. (Wheaton and
Torto at p. 5,6,7)
In addition to the surges in the general demand for
national office space, there is further growth
associated to demand related to specific types of space.
Nevertheless, there are dominant factors which dictate
the demand for national office space, as Wheaton and
Torto describe:
Beyond these major market phenomena, it is
also true that there have been changes in the
preference for particular kinds of space.
Shifts in the demand towards non-contiguous
space or "back offices", and a desire for
historic structures or high-rise views are
examples of trends that have helped to shape the
market in any particular period. The fact
remains, however, that the state of the economy,
the growth of office employment, the price of
space, and it's availability remain the
overwhelmingly dominant factors that explain the
past movements in absorption, and should
continue to do so in the future. (Wheaton and
Torto at p. 12)
Wheaton and Torto's study of the national office
construction cycles of the previous thirty years was
used to illustrate that the last ten years were unique.
Over the last ten years, the amount which was built in
four years would have required twenty years in the past.
Wheaton and Torto provided a look at the national
real estate market. The next step is to observe real
estate market behavior from a local perspective. An
examination of both types of markets should provide an
understanding of how the eight variables have affected
real estate.
THE EFFECT OF THE EIGHT VARIABLES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE MASSACHUSETTS RESIDENTIAL MARKET.
A review of the growth in the Massachusetts
residential market also illustrates the impact of the
eight variables. In a study conducted by Karl Case,
professor of economics at Wellesley College, it was
found that the growth rates in the residential market in
Massachusetts over the later part of the 1980's were
significant. The following table documents the
tremendous rate of growth:
Total Existing Home Sales in Massachusetts:
1983-89
(Single-Family Homes, Condos and Co-ops)








(Case at p. 20)
In Massachusetts, economic growth cannot be
confused with the general growth in the population and
the high number of sales of residential dwellings can
not be regarded as sales to new individuals to the
area.In the 1980's what took place was a "churning of
the market," which is internally driven market activity
of homes being sold and resold. "Churning" accurately
describes what occurred in the Massachusetts residential
market.[16]
As the unemployment rate dropped and the labor
market tightened, many of the leading industries of
Massachusetts started to transfer employees into the
area to support the growth that they were experiencing.
The growth of the high tech, financial services, and
administrative support industries required many mid to
high level executives to transfer into the area. The
newly imported managers did not occupy the existing
"blue collar" residential inventory; instead, they
located in new and upscale suburban homes.
Later when the "demand generators" cooled for these
leading industries, their first reaction was to stop
transferring people into this area. The result was
demand for new homes quickly curtailed. The prior
planning for the construction of these new homes and the
investment in time and money into the approvals process
encouraged the builders to continue the building process
until it was complete.
The dramatic rate of economic growth in the
Massachusetts economy has resulted in a large inventory
of residential stock being built. Thus, it is necessary
that a period of time pass before economic forces regain
equilibrium in order for the stock to be absorbed as
Richard Pollard, Chairman of the Massachusetts Bankers
Association explains:
"The New England economy in general, and the
Massachusetts economy in particular, enjoyed an
unprecedented boom during the mid-1980's. The
boom has come to an end as certain advantages
dating from the 1970's and before, such as
lower-than-average home prices and an ample
availability of labor, have turned into
disadvantageously high housing costs and short
labor supply.
A rebalancing of macroeconomic forces must
work itself out; there is no way simply to will
continued hypergrowth when a regional economy
has moved out of balance with competing regional
economies when the national economy itself must
deal with a huge national deficit and trade
imbalance. (Pollard at p. 1)
Despite the current slowdown in the general
economy, there are many reasons why Massachusetts should
consider itself fortunate for the past 15 years of
prosperity. Professor Case describes the history of the
current cycle of economic growth recently experienced by
Massachusetts:
Massachusetts is fortunate to have a well
capitalized banking network traditionally known
for prudence and integrity. At the same time,
it must be said, and will be widely acknowledged
within the industry, that the years of the
"Massachusetts Miracle" led to excesses. Like
many builders and buyers, bankers were not
immune to the illusion that real estate values
would soar unremittingly. Banks have failed and
more will fail because enthusiasm in some cases
resulted in reach exceeding grasp.
What seems to be lost in the current gloom is
where the region and the Commonwealth have been
over the last decade and a half. In 1975 the
Massachusetts economy hit rock bottom. The
unemployment rate went over 12% that year,
second highest in the nation behind Michigan.
Massachusetts faced a bigger budget crisis that
year than it does today. But 1975 was followed
by 15 years of sustained economic growth, with a
pause for the recession of 1981-82., Since 1980,
personal income had risen at a rate of nearly
50% above the national average. Since 1975
nearly 840,000 jobs have been created in
Massachusetts, an increase of 37%. The housing
market boomed from 1983 to 1987, increasing the
value of the existing stock by over a hundred
billion dollars in the Boston metropolitan area
alone. By mid 1987, the unemployment rate stood
at 2.5%. The lowest among the 50 states. It
has been a very prosperous decade and a half".
(Case at p. 14)
The fifteen year period of prosperity experienced by
Massachusetts had a significant effect on the real
estate market. Professor Case points out, the
escalation in prices of housing due to pent-up demand:
The current real estate cycle began back in
1983. In that year the median price of an
existing single family home in Boston was
$82,600, 17% above the national average of
$70,300. Pent-up demand coming out of the
1982-82 recession (during which the prime rate
went over 21%), combined with rapid income
growth, led to a surge of housing demand
beginning in 1983. Existing home sales in
Massachusetts jumped from an annual rate of
34,500 in mid 1982 to 73,900 in early 1983.
Supply in the form of new construction did not
respond at first because zoning regulations and
permitting were controlled by 351 very
independent cities and towns.
The increased demand coupled with a slow
supply response pushed prices sharply higher in
1984. At that point an inflationary psychology
took over and prices boomed from 1984 through
1986. During those years prices were rising at
a rate as high as 3% per month (40% per year),
pushing the median price of an existing home
from $83,600 to $177,000 nearly twice the
national median. (Case at p. 14)
The demand for housing was created more as a result
of the changing makeup of the population rather than
from actual growth. In addition, changes in the
Internal Revenue Code encouraged additional purchases in
the residential market. The result was an overbuilding
of the residential market as Case illustrates:
But there was an important missing
ingredient: population growth was extremely
slow. Prices were not rising because more
people wanted to live here but, because those of
us who did live here wanted bigger and better
houses. That missing element meant that when
the building boom finally caught up with the
price boom, the region overbuilt and overbuilt
quickly. Between 1985 and 1988, construction
employment jumped from 100,000 to 147,000.
Housing starts in the five eastern counties of
the state rose from a rate under 10,000 per year
during the early part of the decade, to just
under 15,000 in early 1985 to a peak of over
22,000 in 1986 and 1987.
Another factor that contributed to the
overbuilding was the internal revenue code.
Much of the building that actually took place in
1986 and 1987 was planned between 1984 and 1986.
During those years , the tax laws were very
favorable to real estate investment. The
Economic Recovery Act of 1981 introduced very
rapid depreciation rules, and passive partners
could write off losses from real estate shelters
with virtually no limit. Condominium investors
enjoyed tax sheltered income and expected to
enjoy sustained appreciation. (Case at p. 15)
By the time that the builders realized that they
had misread demand, a tremendous overstock in the
residential inventory had been created. The passage of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 further discouraged the
absorption of the existing stock. The consequences from
the lower demand for residential housing have been
devastating as Case explains:
The overbuilding on the supply side of the
market ran headlong into a slowing economy on
the demand side and a new tax law. The result
was a large inventory of unsold homes and a
larger inventory of unsold condominiums, As a
result, very few new units are now being built.
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The construction sector has lost 31,000 jobs,
developers and builders are filling the
bankruptcy courts, banks have found themselves
with large portfolios of foreclosed property,
and the housing starts are back down to under
7,000 per year, a drop of over 70%. (Case at p.
16)
Although overbuilding and the misreading of demand
may represent general causes of why projects have
failed, no two properties are alike. While generalities
offer some insight and partially explain why a specific
properties fail, they don't offer complete answers.
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CHAPTER TWO- THE WORKOUT PROCESS
Before looking at the reasons why specific
properties fail, we will look at the workout process. The
bulk of this chapter is based on a series of
interviews with workout specialists in the Northeast.
As we start the 1990's, we are experiencing a depressed
real estate market and a severe credit crunch. The main
focus of all parties involved in a workout situation is:
survival first, a mutually acceptable agreement second.
Understanding the workout process begins by looking
at how the bank views their portfolio of other real
estate owned (OREO). When a solution for nonpayment can
not be "worked out", the bank forecloses and unless the
property can be sold at auction, the property becomes an
asset of the bank, thus, becoming part of the bank's
OREO portfolio:
Other real estate owned is frequently an
unsound bank asset, even when carried at or
below the appraised value. The bank's purchase
of property through foreclosure usually
indicates lack of demand. As time lapses, the
lack of demand becomes more firm and the
soundness of real estate for which there is no
demand becomes more questionable. Banks usually
lose money in liquidating other real estate
owned despite the apparent adequacy of appraised
value. (Comptroller's Handbook, p. 3)
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In recent years financial institutions have been
faced with a rising number of non-performing real estate
loans. In increasing numbers borrowers are approaching
their lenders to seek some sort of relief hoping to
reach some form of compromise on debt service
obligations. Out of necessity, lenders are forced to
work with their borrowers by assisting them through
these difficult times.
The "workout concession" most commonly granted to
the borrower is debt restructuring. This may be in the
form of reduced interest rates, extension of the loan
amortization period, accrual of interest, forgiveness
principal and interest, deed in lieu of foreclosure and
many other variations. Regardless of the concession,
the lenders aim is always the same, to improve it's
position in a difficult lending situation. The borrower
tries to obtain these concessions and come to an
agreement with his lending officer, a person with whom
he usually has a business and personal relationship
with.
Reduced interest rates, simply means to lower the
contract rate of interest. For example, lowering the
interest rate from 16% to 10 1/4% lowers the monthly
costs of debt service and attempts to increase the
probability of the bank being repaid.
Extension of the loan amortization period is where
the term to maturity may be any where from 7 to 15
years, which is normally the case on a commercial
building . By extending the amortization period or the
term to maturity to 30 or 40 years, it will lower the
monthly payment by spreading the repayment of the loan
over a longer period of time.
Accrual of interest is when there are two rates of
interest. A "pay rate" and an "accrual rate". the idea
is that the property can not afford to pay the agreed
upon interest rate, hopefully for a determinable amount
of time, as in the case where the project requires a
longer period of time to reach stabilization/lease up
than anticipated. In this case the bank will allow the
owner to pay a lower rate of interest for a period of
time and will pay the difference at a later date. For
example the contract rate of interest will be 16%, but,
for a period of time the owner of the property will pay
10 1/4%. The difference of 5 3/4% will be deferred, and
usually added on to the total amount owed or it can be
paid in a lump sum payment.
Forgiveness of principal and interest is a case
where the bank does not require the owner of the
property to pay back a certain amount of money, the
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amount would be forgiven. This is very rarely done and
requires exceptional circumstances for the bank to
consider this as an option.
Deed in lieu of foreclosure is when the owner
willfully gives the title of the property back to the
bank as full consideration of the outstanding mortgage,
for which he is liable. Both parties considers it an
even swap, property for the debt. The bank would
basically turn around and resell the property to recoup
the principal.
Being involved with a workout scenario is an
emotionally draining experience for all concerned. Many
real estate projects are a result of a lifetime of work
for the borrower to place him in a position of either
building or acquiring a piece of property. The prospect
of working so long towards a goal only to see the
project on the edge of default is an emotionally
stressful situation for any developer.
A workout specialist who has worked with troubled
properties in both the northeast and southwest over a
seventeen year period explained that the first thing he
tries to do is assess whether the problems with the
properties are the direct result of the actions by the
owner or the result of factors in the market which were
completely outside the owners control. Next, the
workout specialist tries to determine if the continued
presence of the owner will make a positive contribution
to the resolution of the problems or if his presence
will hinder the work that needs to be done. If it is
decided that the owner will hinder the progress, the
owner will be removed from day to day control of the
property. The workout specialist feels if it is
possible he will keep the owner in place. In his
opinion it is always better to work with the property's
owners since they have a vested interest in seeing the
project become a success. In contrast, a new person
entering the project without knowing the details of what
has transpired will likely slow the resolution of the
problem even further.
The consequences of failing to come to an agreement
with your original lending officer to repay the loan
often forces the loan to be reclassified as "repayment
in question?" once this occurs the bank will place the
loan with the "workout department" where a resolution
will most always take place.
The workout department is really the controlled
loan department. Individuals who enter the controlled
loan department may hope for a "workout", but, in
reality will now encounter a bank officer who will
probably not be very flexible and who will be determined
to obtain specific guarantees so the bank will receive
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the money owed to them. The controlled loan department
in large commercial banks usually consists of twenty or
more bank officers who deal exclusively with people who
are not paying their loans and very likely will not be
able to pay them.
The workout process begins with the loan leaving
the original lending officer and is turned over to
controlled loans. Unless a quick resolution can take
place, the bank moves quickly to protect it's interest,
they immediately issue a "demand" for payment and begins
the foreclosure procedures against the borrower. The
banks plan is to be as efficient as possible in going
through the foreclosure process. The next step will be
to go to court to get a "judgement" under the Sailors
and Soldiers Act of 1941 which should take three to four
weeks.
During those three to four weeks the bank will try
to negotiate a settlement. The banks are negotiating
from a position of strength knowing that a favorable
judgement is three to four weeks away. The bank is in
the position where they don't have to accept any
proposal unless it radically improves it's lending
position.
A controlled loan specialist at a major New England
bank indicates that banks feels if they negotiate first
and then follow with foreclosure proceedings, they face
the possibility of losing six months worth of interest
and the possibly of having to liquidate the property in
a market that could deteriorated further. The bank is
concerned about the processing time required to complete
a foreclosure if the negotiations fail.
After the judgement is rendered, the court will set
a "return date" which will allow the borrower six weeks
to come forward with a reason why the loan was not paid
or to seek relief under the Sailors and Soldiers Act.
Nevertheless, the bank can start to advertise for an
auction as soon as the judgement has been given.
While Massachusetts is the only state in the union
that has not repealed the Sailors and Soldiers Act, the
Act will only provide limited protection to the
thousands of businessmen and women who are unable to pay
their debt service. The Act only provides protection to
sailors and soldiers who are currently on active duty in
a declared war. Nonetheless, the Act does provide some
time for the average borrower to find a solution.
The controlled loans department spends most of
their time dealing with problem loans. Controlled loan
officers feel their job is to attempt to collect on
"projects that should never been financed. Money was
lent to inexperienced, undercapitalized individuals on
ill conceived projects". Many individuals in these
departments feel that "sweetheart deals were rampant"
and that people in authority turned their backs on the
standard lending criteria which allowed risky loans.
With the knowledge that most of these loans were
imprudent, ...it was the herd mentality of the worst
kind".
Most real estate professional interviewed agreed in
retrospect that even if it were possible to maintain
discipline within the banking industry from 1982 to
1986, they still would not have cooled the enthusiasm
for real estate development. A specialist from a
controlled loan department of a major Boston bank echoed
these feelings:
... bankers should have never given out 100%
financing, and developers should have never
taken it, everyone knew it was wrong. They
(lending officers) used examples of large profit
taking as an excuse to open the flood gates and
allowed years of experience to remain silent.
In addition, there are serious questions regarding
the mentality of developers during the boom period. A
senior workout specialist at a major bank in New England
describes the aggressive behavior of developers:
Many developers believe those late night cable
programs on real estate development. The ones
that say you can buy all that property with no
money down, and if anyone says that you can't,
then we'll show you away to negotiate around
them!. Workout specialists have little patience
for the naive, new, arrogant developers.
As a result of this attitude, developers who have
been draining the excess cash flow from their projects
are balking when the banks require they increase the
equity in existing projects.
Times have changed, eighteen to twenty four months
ago a successful workout would likely have resulted from
the discussions held with a officer in controlled loans.
However, with the declining market in real estate, and
with many of those agreements coming back to the bank
because the borrower cannot pay the negotiated lower
debt service. Banks find themselves in a position of
having to liquidate the properties in a market that is
significantly worse than it was two years ago. Given
the failure rate of these renegotiated loans, banks have
come to see the "workout situations" as a giant set of
mistakes.
Changes which have taken place in the bankruptcy
laws greatly assist the banks ability in recovering
their assets. In October of 1989, the laws where
revised to speed up the process in order to make the
borrowers assets more available to lenders trying to
seek repayment. Prior to being revised, the entire
bankruptcy proceedings would take six to nine months.
Currently, the same proceedings will take four to six
months.
The marriage of the real estate and the banking
industries during the 1980's, is dissolving in the
1990's. The relationship is hostile. The banking and
real estate industries are very different than in recent
past. Banking professionals are no longer willing to
offer the same solutions that they previously made
available. Borrowers perceptions and expectations need
to change to deal with the new realities of the current
business climate.
While borrowers would benefit greatly from the
assistance offered by banks, more often than not
borrowers are using threats as an attempt to coax the
lenders into offering concessions. Borrowers threaten
to go into bankruptcy or to file a lender liability suit
as a means to forestall foreclosure. obviously, these
threats contribute greatly to the current hostility
between banks and borrowers.
As long as these threats are part of the
negotiation process a mutually satisfying agreement is
unlikely and the odds of irreparable damage to the
relationship between lender and borrower increases.
In the past, bankruptcy was the primary tool used
as the lever to force bankers to yield concessions.
This was especially true of the troubles experienced in
the Southwest. However, times have changed and lender
liability has become the latest weapon borrowers are
using to persuade lenders to workout their loans. Many
of the officers in the controlled loan departments who
were interviewed say that lender liability is an issue
that they have to deal with on a daily basis. A Vice
President in charge of the controlled loan department of
a major Boston bank explains:
"If one of the clients I'm dealing with does not
threaten me with lender liability, then the guy
next to me will be threatened".
The legal basis for lender liability originates
from a court decision which held that: "verbal
statements were implied commitments."
The lender liability suit surfaced from
conversations which occurred when a borrower was signing
a loan approved by the lending officer with whom he had
a long term business relationship. The loan was
negotiated with a few years to maturity. These loans
are referred to as bullet or balloon loans. In this
case the borrower had no experience with this type of
agreement. During the signing, the borrower asked the
lending officer how the balloon payment was going to be
made when the note came due in such a short time?. In
response, the lending officer assured the borrower not
to worry and that the situation will be worked out when
the time comes.
The judge ruled that "verbal statements were
implied commitments" and in this case the verbal
statement implied a commitment to offer new financing
when the note came due.
Regardless of the impact of the lender liability
suits, the trend is clear. If you cannot pay your debt
to the bank, it will be increasingly difficult for you
to maintain control and ownership of your property.
Banks are now under enormous pressure to deal with their
problems. As a result, the banks are faced with
examiners who want them to recognize their assets at
their current value, which means tomorrows liquidation
price.
The problem of recognizing the current value of
troubled property, forces everyone involved to
realistically deal with the economic viability of the
property. A pension fund advisor discussed the
realities of a depressed real estate market:
The property is only worth what the property can
produce in income, regardless of how much it
cost to build. This is not rocket science, and
any property can be sold or fully leased if you
lower the price far enough.
The pension fund advisor further felt that
workouts are more of a political issue at banks. The
question is when will a Sr. V.P. authorize his people to
bite the bullet and lower the price?. The pension fund
advisor sympathized with the workout choices the banks
have :
How are the decisions at the banks were
made? How much is quantitative and how much was
emotional?... At some point you have to come to
grips with a loss or settle for lower returns.
There will be lasting effects from the failed
market of the past. The current workout environment
will play a large role in the future of real estate.
One predictable result according to a Vice President of
a major New England bank is that the heavy losses the
banks are experiencing in real estate will prompt banks
to reclassify real estate into a much higher risk
category. This reclassification will result in the cost
of capital for real estate increasing significantly in
the future.
The potential action by banks to reclassify real
estate projects into a high risk category is consistent
with the feeling held by TCW's Vincent Martin, he feels
that it is important for that the real estate market
develop a control mechanism to restrain the supply side
of the equation. An increasing cost of capital
resulting from tighter bank controls may be just the
control mechanism needed.
CHAPTER THREE - THE ACADEMIC VIEW
Chapter One described the history of some of the
factors influencing the real estate market over the last
decade. The eight variables included in chapter one
were accumulated through interviews and surveys of real
estate professionals. To begin the research for this
thesis, these professionals were asked what they felt
were the primary forces driving the real estate market
of the 1980's?.
This chapter focuses on specific properties and
projects and discusses the impact of these variables on
the micro real estate market. Specifically their impact
on distressed real estate is examined at length. A 1985
survey by James Boykin provides an excellent point
from which to start questioning these real estate
professionals, about the specific causes of project
failure.
If more specific reasons for the default of
individual properties can be determined and understood,
this information will serve as the foundation for sound
economic decision-making as the properties re-enter the
market. The following chapter continues toward the goal
of this thesis to develop a framework for thinking about
workouts in the future.
The article by Boykin entitled "Why Real Estate
Projects Fail" provided the results of a 1985 national
survey of real estate executives of the primary reasons
why real estate projects fail. Boykin identified nine
specific reasons why projects fail.






(6) Lack of professional experience.
(7) Construction problems.
(8) Weak project management.
(9) Inadequate cash flow projections.
market
In order to better understand the nine specific
reasons for real estate failures which Boykin includes
in his study, an individual discussion of each reason
should prove useful.
(1) Inaccurate or overly optimistic market feasibility
study.
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The industry surveys proved to Boykin that the age old
problem of overestimating market demand for real estate
still holds true today. The overestimation was
attributed to several factors ranging from poor data
bases to improper analysis:
The executives who faulted feasibility studies
all implied that the studies erred by forecasting
an overly optimistic absorption rate of space or of
market acceptance of the space. This failure was
sometimes identified as an inaccurate determination
of the magnitude of need for the proposed space.
Other studies were characterized as containing
inadequate analysis of market data or as poorly
interpreting the available data such as terrain,
markets, and demographics. Some executives
suggested that reasonable economic feasibility and
marketability reports occasionally were analyzed
improperly by the developer. (Boykin at p. 89)
(2) Poor planning.
A number of survey respondents concluded that one
of the key ingredients consistently missing was in the
preliminary planning of a project. Often, goals were
set which could simply not be accomplished:
Inadequacy of planning prior to a project's
development or the acquisition of real estate
was the second most frequently mentioned cause
of failure, but it was a difficult cause to
pinpoint. Sometimes it was identified as lack
of project preplanning or improper design and
conception. It was related to "unrealistic
goals" or to uncertainty about the final goal to
be achieved. (Boykin at p. 89)
(3) Financing problems.
one of the most critical elements of any successful
real estate deal-- proper capitalization -- was also
consistently cited as a reason for the failure of many
of the 1980's real estate deals. The effects of higher
interest rates, undercaptalized projects, and
overleveraged financial structuring contributed
significantly to the growth of failed real estate:
Respondents specified two types of financing
problems that led to project failure: a rise in
interest rates after the project was conceived
and improper structure of financing. Not
surprising, the second problem was always
associated with the first. However, even in the
absence of interest changes, projects failed
because the were undercapitalized or
overleveraged structures that resulted in
unanticipated financial difficulties when there
was an unfavorable change in economic
conditions. (Boykin at p. 89)
(4) Location Problems
Inexperience on the part of real estate developers new
to the process led to the consistent selection of poor
locations. Again, a wide range of problems existed which
included poor selection of sites and numerous zoning
conflicts.
Location problems included sites that were
simply wrong for the given project, sites that
did not coincide with local planning objectives,
and sites that clashed with surrounding zoning
and building esthetics. The failure to obtain
the appropriate zoning was included among
location problems. (Boykin at p. 89)
(5) Improper Timing.
The lack of experience was also evident in the area of
judging the economic feasibility of real estate projects.
Poorly evaluated projects were extra sensitive to the
changes in market conditions:
Improper timing as a cause of project failure
seems to be almost entirely associated with
"inaccurate feasibility study". ( of course, the
same is also true, to a lesser degree, of
"financing problems" and "location problems".)
Projects fail because they encounter unfavorable
changes in the local or national economy, because
they ignore national or local trends, or because
they fail to specific market downturns. (Boykin
at p. 89)
(6) Lack of professional experience.
(7) Construction problems.
(8) Weak project management.
If the three reasons for failure, lack of
professional experience, construction problems,
and weak project management, are considered to be
different facets of a major category, "failure of
the project developer to control the project,"
this cause becomes as important as the first
cause on the list, poor feasibility studies.
Examples of developer failure are as diverse as
the number of failures. Among the subcauses that
contribute to developer failure are the
following:
* Insufficient experience
* Lack of "follow through" after the project
is completed
* Inept administration
* Inexperienced or incompetent project personnel
* Understaffed project teams
* Excessive personnel turnover on project teams
* Inaccurate construction estimates
* Ill-advised economies on construction materials
* Excessive or unanticipated cost overruns (for
many reasons). (Boykin at p. 89)
Failure to understand the pipeline and the
unwillingness to recognize the impact of other properties
are recognized as two examples of the lack of
professional experience in the field of real estate.
During the 1980's with the general availability of
capital, many people entered the real estate market who
were clearly unqualified to do so. Successful
businessmen, accustomed to watching the details and
overseeing their own businesses assumed the skills of
their business were transferrable to real estate
development. They entered the development business often
times for a single project which ended with tragic
results.
(9) Inadequate cash flow projections.
Inaccurate cash flow projections are a cause
of failure that can be subsumed in all of the
preceding sections. The problem may be caused by
a lack of understanding of the project,
unrealistic assumptions, lack of knowledge about
the market or the suitability of the project for
that market or by underestimated expenses and
costs. (Boykin at p. 89)
The lack of specific knowledge regarding the
financing of real estate projects also became very
apparent with the number of failures due to poor
financial analysis. Cash flow projections were simply
wrong in a number of cases.
Boykin's survey was conducted during a period when
New England real estate was booming and Southwestern
real estate was crashing. During the New England boom,
local observers were fond of pointing out the
differences between New England and Texas. Since
Boykin's failure sample represents the Southwestern
experience to a great degree, a local New England sample
of interviewees was asked to respond to the Boykin
factors. Their responses to the list is contained in
chapter four, The Industry View.
CHAPTER FOUR - THE INDUSTRY VIEW
This chapter explores variables that impacted specific
real estate projects by presenting the results of
interviews and comparing them to the framework for
questions presented in chapter three. The intent in
these interviews was to encourage industry professionals
to go beyond the generalities to explain the specific
reasons why properties failed. Thirty interviews were
conducted, interviewees included: bank presidents and
members of a bank board of directors, real estate
brokers, workout and controlled loan specialists, real
estate lawyers and bankruptcy attorneys, accountants,
consultants, professors, developers, and property
managers.
REASONS FOR DEFAULT
Boykin presented nine variables that can be used to
explain why a particular property would go into default.
In general, the interviewees agreed with the variables
Boykin presented, although they tended to group the nine
variables into three main categories: inaccurate or
overly optimistic market feasibility studies, debt
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structure and lack of professional experience. The
industry professionals, as a group, placed the remaining
six variables under the three main categories because
they regarded them as inseparable. The interviewees
expanded upon the descriptions that Boykin offered and
proposed several variables that were not included in the
Boykin model.
THE INTERVIEWEES MODEL:
(1) Inaccurate or overly optimistic feasibility study:
* Poor planning




(2) Debt structure, capitalization: debt/equity
* related to inexperience
(3) Lack of professional experience:
* construction problems
* weak project management
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES ADVANCED BY INTERVIEWEES:
(4) Slow down of regional economy:
* overestimating demand
* ignore macroeconomic factors which impact
businesses need for real estate





INACCURATE OR OVERLY OPTIMISTIC MARKET FEASIBILITY
STUDY.
Over half of the interviewees cited overly
optimistic market surveys as the main reason that
projects fail. Within this category, they included
characteristics Boykin described under his category of
the same name as well as those he described under poor
planning, poor market knowledge, location problems and
improper timing and overbuilt markets. To the
interviewees, these variables were intricately related
to each other and to the downturn in the real estate
market.
A bank consultant specializing in dealing with
distressed properties said he saw cases where
"developers would go through the proper procedures of
conducting a survey of the market that they intended to
build in... while at the same time... two other
developers would use the same market survey to support
the feasibility of their project." In these cases he saw
all the variables at work.
An example of a specific project which illustrated
this was described by a vice president of an eminent
development firm which is adjusting to the market by
counterbalancing their excess capacity with workouts for
banks. She cited an example where developers did not
correctly assess demand and in addition, failed to
consider other similar projects planned and under
construction in the area.
Three residential condominium projects were built
in a small village in Massachusetts. The second and
third developers started similar high-end attached
housing projects based on the enthusiastic response that
the first developer received from the village residents.
Developers two and three did not confirm if there was
enough of a demand for their projects. As it happened,
there was not sufficient demand to sell out all the
units in the first development, let alone projects two
and three.
The developer responsible for the workout of the
first project pointed out that the units were priced too
high to attract people from the local area. The
original developers remained inflexible when the market
started to shift during the construction phase, and
later, the banks refused to allow the developer to drop
the prices when it became apparent the market had
changed. The banks action was described as "holding the
developers feet to the fire," all this resulted in the
bank foreclosing on the property and resulted in the
bank spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to
differentiate the first project from the second and the
third. The bank also found it necessary to offer low
interest rate financing in the hope of selling the
units.
She agreed with other interviewees who stated that
most often, " your first loss is your best loss." The
reasoning is that a troubled property doesn't improve
with age, and it is better to cut your price, sell the
units and learn a lesson. In this project specific
example, the impact of the variables was characterized
by the inability to correctly assess demand, form
realistic goals, select a location that would support
the product, acknowledge general market trends and
understand the impact of competition on the existing
demand. All of these variables were critical factors
which affected the project.
A university real estate professor and developer
offered his insight in regard to "poor planning." He saw
people utilizing "short term strategies for long term
goals," and explained that many people unrealistically
entered the real estate market, which has always been a
long term business, with the intentions of selling out
within a period of months instead of years.
"Improper timing" described by Boykin attributes
the failure of projects to unfavorable changes in the
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regional or national economy, specific market downturns
or trends. Many interviewees attributed the failure of
specific projects to this variable. A banking
consultant commented on the slow down of the regional
economy when he said, "demand generators," or
businesses, are being negatively affected by the
regional economic slow down. A fundamental fact is
that, since real estate provides facilities for other
businesses, a slow down in the regional economy
eventually hurts real estate. He went on to describe
what occurs when you combine the downturn in the economy
with the existing oversupply of real estate.
"The competition for tenants drives down the
rental rates and real estate values decline as a
result."
He maintained that the large supply of excess
inventory has to be considered to be one of the
principal reasons of default, although it is more a
result of the variables discussed in chapter one.
DEBT STRUCTURE.
Throughout the interviewing process, professionals
attributed the failure of many projects to improper debt
structures. The phrase "too much debt" was used over
and over again. Many times a project was started just
because the financing was available. Lenders regularly
accepted the projections developers presented to them.
In many cases, bankers based their lending decisions on
personal relationships with developers and past
successes, rather than on the economics of the specific
project . During of 1982 to 1986 many projects were "tax
driven deals", the reason many projects were built or
acquired was to exploit tax benefits for investors.
A vice president in a major accounting firm said
that developers were "great salesman, very aggressive,
bullish and very optimistic. The accountant said many
times the developers would ask for 100 percent
financing, fully expecting the bank to only authorize 80
percent. When they got the full amount of the loan,
they would consider it "free money," and in many cases
would use the money to initiate the next development
project. They place an enormous amount of their efforts
just to get financing for their projects. "The
developers loan presentation was so polished that when
the developers received the full amount they requested,
they convinced themselves the project could support the
full amount of the loan".
The bank consultant specializing in distressed
properties also felt that the "easy money" of the 1980's
was primary cause of default. He said that "giving
developers 100% financing was unfortunate because they
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just did not handle it in a responsible manner".
A real estate professional specializing in property
management and who manages troubled assets for banks
commented that in many cases there was simply too much
debt. He said he could not believe the "amount of money
that was lent on these properties, they could only
support 25 percent of the debt." He was involved with
three apartment buildings suffering from deferred
maintenance with a 40 to 60 percent vacancy rate that
had been refinanced well above the properties ability to
support the new levels of debt.
The president of a bank consulting firm gave the
only different opinion regarding debt, by cutting right
to the heart of the debt issue. I asked him if he felt
the main causes of failure were "overbuilding and too
much debt"?, his response was: "If you feel debt was the
cause of failure, then you just don't understand!". He
pointed out that the overall real estate market and
individual properties are affected to the same degree
whether they have all debt or all equity. "Is a
property which is owned by a large pension fund that has
zero debt affected any less than the property owned by a
first time developer with 100% debt, when the regional
economy slows down and there is an oversupply of real
estate?" He continued, "...an oversupply of property
creates competition for the same tenants, which drives
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down rental rates and as a result the value of the real
estate declines." The bank consultant pointed out that
debt only magnified the problems of the real estate,
causing certain people to be taken out of the market
sooner.
Pension funds have the financial strength to
weather any downturn in the real estate market, but when
real estate produces lower yields, the pension funds
will respond by pulling future fund allocations out of
real estate and place a higher concentration of their
funds in alternative investments.
The consultant had another point about the impact
of the changing tax benefits on a project. He said that
TRA of 86 took away the tax benefits "that subsidized
the value" of real estate; when tax benefits were
discontinued, the realization that the projects were not
economically viable had to be dealt with.
A former banker and workout specialist who is
currently working for a real estate syndicator in Texas,
talked about his experiences regarding the properties
his new employer acquired. The company he currently
works for acquired 351 buildings and created limited
partnerships to take advantage of the tax benefits real
estate was enjoying from 1981 to 1986. When the tax
benefits were substantially discontinued with TRA 86,
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not one of the properties could support it's underlying
debt.
The syndicator spends his time taking each property
through chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings to restructure
the debt.
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Almost two-thirds of the interviewees cited lack of
professional experience as a variable which played a
major role in the failure of specific projects. As a
group they felt inexperience contributed to many of the
problems related to the first category involving
inaccurate or overly optimistic feasibility studies,
poor planning, poor market knowledge improper timing and
location problems. To a lesser degree this variable was
also related to problems with the financing structure of
projects that failed. There were, however, other
problems rooted within inexperience that were separate
from those already described in the first two
categories, including one that Boykin described as weak
project management.
Interviewees pointed to the personality of the
classic real estate developer as a reason causing him to
have unrealistic expectations. Another workout
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specialist commented that young
people "feel immortal" when they
money. They "kid themselves into
golden touch and ignore the voice
inexperienced business
receive a large sum of
thinking they have the
of experience."
Some of the examples of these variables advanced by
the interviewees included instances were projections
that continued to escalate over the life of the
investment. Other common errors were found in many
proformas, they included: requiring a 5% increase in net
operating income (NOI) per year, no planned vacancy, and
no reserves to pay for future tenant turnover expenses.
A workout specialist described inexperienced
developers this way: "These new developers just did not
know what they were doing....... They got land... got
contractor... got financing... got building... and got
clobbered!".
A mortgage broker who had
commented that he saw cases where
in development or in operating
financing, got half way through the





Several senior workout officials at a major
accounting firm pointed out that this problem also
existed in large development firms. They said managers
in development firms rarely had the in-house controls
necessary to properly manage the development phase or
the project management of existing properties.
These accountants noted that financial controls
were critical to provide managers with feedback on the
financial status of the projects and they had seen cases
where controls were extremely inadequate and by the time
problems were recognized it was too late to make the
appropriate adjustments. Lack of sufficient staff as
well as overburdened staff also led to crisis situations
within real estate companies. Their suggestion for
bankers was that "lenders should look to the substance
to accomplish the realities." He thought that many
companies did not have the staff to supervise a
development project. They said Eventually "the
realities of the market catch up" and many of the
failures he saw were a result of in-house deficiencies
instead of real estate specific problems.
RELAXED LENDING CRITERIA AND FRAUD
An interviewee who worked in a controlled loan
department brought up this variable which Boykin did not
include in his article. The officer who worked in a
large bank said that relaxed lending criteria and fraud
was the reason many troubled loans were approved. He
had seen cases where there had been "money under the
table to the lending officer, misrepresentation to the
loan committee and non-presentation to the loan
committee." He had also seen loans on troubled
properties that were made because a member of the board
of directors had an interest in the project.
He cited cases where lenders were given improper
incentives to lend. For example, in some instances
lending officers' pay was tied to the quantity and not
the quality of loan dollars placed. Another example
involved bank lending goals which had been set
unrealistically high and had forced lending officers to
stretch lending guidelines to achieve them.
Although fraud probably played a part in project
failures, it is unlikely it was a major cause. None of
the other interviewees made any mention of fraud,
although they did describe cases of incompetence which
bordered on fraudulent behavior by lending officers.
A Boston Globe article on fraud in the Savings and
Loan debacle supported the opinion of many of the
interviewees by down-playing the role of fraud in the
thrifts:
"Despite, or perhaps because of, the
regulators efforts, saving and loan loses are
now so large that for fraud to account for even
one third of them, or $50 billion, would require
a level of criminal wrong doing so substantial
many authorities think it unlikely.
For example, it would mean that fraud in
this one industry was more than twice the $23.5
billion of fraud of all types that the federal
government investigated in the 1980's, and 25
times the amount that it prosecuted, according
to justice department statistics.
"If there was that much fraud, why are only
hearing about it today?" asked James R. Barth,
an Auburn University economist formerly with the
office of thrift supervision, which regulates
savings and loan institutions. "Does anyone
really believe that people could loot these
institutions of that much and the government not
know a thing until it was all over?"
Public anger over the huge salaries,
exorbitant perks and cozy deals at individual
institutions have been raging for more than a
year, but concern that fraud was endemic in the
industry, and a principal cause of many of the
losses taxpayers must now foot, took off this
spring when federal regulators reported that
they had discovered evidence of wrong doing at
60 percent of failed institutions....
Of the 21,174 cases of suspected savings
and loan crime referred to the department so
far, 83 percent involve less than $25,000,
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh told a senate
committee last week.
"The mere fact that you can find fraud at
these institutions is not surprising; companies
in their death throes lose control of their
employees," said Edward J. Kane, an Ohio State
University economist who has written extensively
on the crisis.
Along the way, all agree the policies
attracted some crooks.
"What the government did was the equivalent
of giving away the keys to the bank," said
Litan. So who do you blame when the money's all
gone, the people who took it, or the people who
gave away the keys?"
The controlled loan. officer said he had seen
avoidable mistakes made by inexperienced lending
officers. In one example a lending officer had accepted
land as collateral based on an appraisal without ever
seeing the property, only to find out that the lot was
land-locked, unbuildable and the same lot was used as
collateral on four other projects. In another situation
land was held jointly and could not be sold to satisfy
the debt. It is clear that loan documentation has
emerged as a main focus for controlled loan officers.
Evidence of inexperience on the part of other
professionals can be seen in several of the examples
given above.
A manager at a large accounting firm commented that
it was difficult for professional outside the real
estate industry to understand why developers and bankers
apparently did not perform adequate risk analysis.
OBSOLESCENCE
Two of the interviewees identified one last variable
that contributes to the failure of specific projects.
That variable is obsolescence. Obsolescence is broken
down into three types: functional, physical and
economic. Functional obsolescence can be the result of
poor design in a project, whether it be residential
apartment complex or a commercial distribution facility.
If the original use of the project can not be realized
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because of poor design, the project would be considered
functionally obsolete. Physical obsolescence can be the
result of age and can affect many types of real estate,
including apartments or multi-story wood frame
manufacturing facilities. The former banker turned
syndicator attributed the failure of many of the
apartment complexes with which he was taking through
bankruptcy to the combined effect of the changes in the
tax code in 1986 and the obsolescence (design and age)
of the buildings.
Economic obsolescence is a loss in value due to
factors external to the property and considered out of
the owners control. Some of the causes of economic
obsolescence is: poor location, noxious uses nearby,
access problems. The economic obsolescence accrues to
the improvements on the property only.
Obsolescence is either curable or incurable, the
following three matrixes are used to illustrate the most







Many variables that would make new projects
functionally obsolete are considered curable, however,
most professionals interviewed considered poor design to
be incurable. An example of obsolescence as a result of
technological change would be the case of inner city
multi-storied, wooden, manufacturing facilities that
were replaced by large single story plants built out of
steel and concrete, which required the space to take








Physical obsolescence occurs in existing buildings
and can be the result of one or a combination of





OR A CHANGE IN
NEARBY USE
Ill-conceived projects are considered economically
obsolete and are considered by most professionals to be
incurable.
Questions exist as to who is to blame for the
current oversupply of real estate? Was the overshooting
of the supply due to the overly lax credit standards and
intensely competitive expansion by the banks during the
boom years of real estate? Was the oversupply due to
overly optimistic developers? The answer probably lies
somewhere in the middle. Karl Case of Wellesley College
explains how the inherent competition within the real
estate industry promotes overdevelopment:
one the reality is that we do not have
central planning in this economy; private risk
taking entrepreneurs who build projects in Hull
don't coordinate their activities with those who
build in old Orchard Beach or in Revere. From
the standpoint of banks, what could be safer in
the environment of 1983-87 than an 80%, fully
collateralized loan? In fact, it was a natural
downturn, and now the results must be dealt
with.
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CHAPTER 5- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Given this unprecedented time in the history of
the real estate and banking industries, it is unecessary
to spend the time to assess blame for the currently
depressed market. Assessing blame is both
counterproductive and likely to offer very little value.
While this paper is an initial step in understanding why
troubled properties exist and how the workout process
affect them, the paper also illustrates that further
research is needed in developing a solution to
successfully dealing with large portfolios of distressed
properties.
These interview results are generally supportive
of Boykin's results, but they differ in the way that
respondents view the relationship between the factors.
In addition, the two new categories of Obsolescence and
Fraud were added.
A dominant theme that consistently surfaced
throughout the research for this thesis was the obvious
lack of an adherence to the fundamentals of market and
financial analysis. Developers simply did not conduct
even the most basic analysis on many of the properties
developed during the 1980's. In response to the
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competitive market most banks were facing, many of their
financing decisions made during this period of time were
based on guidelines generated internally rather than on
a complete analysis on a project-by-project basis.
Given the long term impact of real estate development
decisions, it is imperative that these decisions be
economically sound based on a comprehensive evaluation
of all market and financial information available. This
type of analysis is critical in determining the
feasibility of the acquiring and developing new
properties.
Four primary conclusions can be drawn from this
thesis. First, the importance of sound, consistent and
unyielding underwriting criteria for financial
institutions. Guidelines must be established that are
both practical and realistic. Second, that there is no
substitute for sound experience and judgement as the
development industry has proven once again. The current
rash of failures illustrates that the ability to obtain
financing and build a building is a very small part of
the complex business of real estate. Third, the
importance of fundamental market analysis is absolutely
critical. In addition, it must be understood that
supply and demand are separate and distinct and very few
assumptions can be made without sufficient analysis.
This thesis includes several examples of inexperienced
developers who mistakenly believed that the constant
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supply of new products entering the market reflected
additional demand. The current market proves that it
does not. The real estate market will simply not absorb
every product produced. Finally, investors must
recognize that banks are financial institutions which
loan money. Banks are not investment advisors. There
is an obligation on the part of investors to complete
proper analysis and make informed decisions to invest
independent of the influence of lending officers. In
addition, borrowers must be willing to accept 100% of
the risk associated with properly repaying the
liability.
If anything, the current real estate market
reflects a hard learned lesson on the part of developers
that being overly aggressive without doing proper
homework is a dangerous combination. It is the
responsibility of the developers of the future to avoid
the same mistakes which have put the real estate market
in the precarious position it is in today. only then
will equilibrium return to the real estate market.
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